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U.S. agriculture faced severe economic problems in the early 1980s. The prob- 
lems are apparent in the data on farm income and the farm sector’s balance 
sheet. Real farm income (including government assistance) in 1980-84  aver- 
aged about half of  its level of the period before the commodity boom in the 
1970s. The U.S. Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) estimate of farm equity, 
the value of  farm assets minus liabilities, declined from $1.14 trillion (1987 
dollars) at the end of 1980 to roughly half of that value, $0.6 trillion on January 
1, 198.5. U.S. wheat growers were among the hardest hit. 
The economic problems of wheat growers were addressed in several ways, 
some of which caused more problems than they solved. The price paid to farm- 
ers for wheat placed in  government ownership was  increased to $4.00 per 
bushel for the 1982 crop. It had been only $1.37 up to 197.5. U.S. wheat acre- 
age planted expanded 4.5 percent, from 59 million acres in 1973 to 86 million 
acres in  1982, and the USDA increased its wheat  stocks to over a billion 
bushels in 1982, the highest level since the early 1960s. In reaction, the Pay- 
ment in Kind (PIK) program was  introduced and idled 30 million acres of 
wheat base in 1983, the largest supply control effort ever. In 1984, direct pay- 
ments to wheat growers rose to exceed $1.5 billion. Yet none of these measures 
was capable of  stemming the decline in  income and equity values through 
1985. Because weak export demand was a key element of wheat’s economic 
problems, it was natural to look to export promotion as an additional policy 
tool. 
Bruce L. Gardner is professor of agricultural and resource economics at the University of Mary- 
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6.1  The Birth of the Export Enhancement Program 
In  1983 the Reagan administration, after debate settled only at the cabinet 
level, accepted the idea of ad hoc  subsidized exports of  Commodity Credit 
Corporation (CCC)-owned wheat to targeted North African markets where Eu- 
ropean Community (EC) wheat was being sold with the help of their export 
subsidies. This was intended to serve the dual purpose of reducing excessive 
stock levels and retaliating against EC export subsidies. This venture  was a 
substantial political success, affording an opportunity to attack the EC, please 
farmers, and hold off congressional pressure for more sweeping programs. The 
impetus was thus established that led eventually to the full-fledged Export En- 
hancement Program (EEP). 
In Congress, the idea of  legislation to target in-kind export subsidies at the 
EC did not prevail when it was first seriously considered in 1983. The principal 
reason given by opponents was the worry that such legislation would trigger a 
trade war in which the EC would increase their subsidies and perhaps withdraw 
previously negotiated concessions such as their duty-free binding on U.S. oil- 
seed products and feed grain substitutes. In addition, the secretary of agricul- 
ture already possessed  sufficient  authorities for ad hoc  export subsidies as 
needed for surplus commodity management or strategic purposes. 
Two years later, as the 1985 farm bill deliberations began, the situation was 
different in two respects:  farm groups had refined their general  support for 
export promotion to more concrete proposals, and U.S. wheat exports had de- 
clined still further while the EC’s grew. In this  situation the administration’s 
desire to continue ad hoc export subsidies without binding legislation was no 
longer politically tenable. 
Senator Robert  Dole  (R-Kansas)  took  the  lead  in  organizing a  series of 
meetings in the spring of  1985 to get the Reagan administration to establish a 
targeted export subsidy program focused on grains, especially wheat. Repre- 
sentatives of  the wheat growers as well as other farm groups attended these 
meetings in Dole’s office. In May 1985, the administration (represented by the 
Office of  Management  and Budget  [OMB] and the  USDA) and  the  Senate 
leadership  (principally  Dole  and  Senator  Edward  Zorinsky  [D-Nebraska]) 
agreed to implement, under existing USDA authorities, an Export Enhance- 
ment Program. 
Politically, the EEP was given the breath of life by a conjunction of interests 
represented by three individuals: Senator Zorinsky’s strong desire, as the rank- 
ing Democrat on the agriculture committee and representative of Nebraska, for 
a substantial export subsidy program; budget director David Stockman’s need 
for Democratic votes on key  economic  legislation; and Senator Dole’s bro- 
kering savvy, with interests in supporting both the administration (as majority 
leader) and Kansas wheat growers. Stockman agreed that the administration 
would implement an export subsidy program, in exchange for Zorinsky’s vote 
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als, with the subsidies to take the form of unwanted CCC surplus commodities 
with a zero budget score. 
The agreed-upon program committed $2 billion worth of CCC-owned com- 
modities to be made available as a bonus to U.S. exporters to expand sales of 
U.S. agricultural commodities in targeted markets. The objectives stated were 
to increase U.S. farm exports and to encourage trading partners to begin seri- 
ous negotiations on agricultural trade problems. 
Guidelines for the EEP, established by the Economic Policy Council of the 
White House, were that each subsidized sale should meet the following crite- 
ria: (1) additionality, that is, net increase in export sales caused by  the subsi- 
dized sale; (2) targeting to displace competing exporters who are subsidizing 
their sales; (3) a net gain to the U.S. economy; and (4)  budget neutrality. Each 
proposed EEP initiative was to be tested against these criteria by an interde- 
partmental committee chaired by the U.S. Trade Representative and the USDA 
that included representatives from the OMB, the Council of Economic Advis- 
ers (CEA), the departments of Treasury, State, Labor, and Commerce, and the 
National Security Council (NSC). It was never publicly  stated how the “net 
gain to the U.S. economy” and “budget neutrality” criteria were to be defined 
and measured. Participants in the process indicated that criterion (3) was not a 
factor in interagency debate, although (I), (2),  and (4) were. 
The Food Security Act as finally enacted in December  1985 codified the 
EEP essentially as the administration had established it six months earlier. The 
main issues, as often in enabling legislation, were what the executive branch 
“shall” (be required to) do and “may” (has discretionary authority to) do. The 
1985 act required the secretary of agriculture to provide CCC commodities at 
no cost to “United States exporters, users, and processors and foreign purchas- 
ers,” and required that a total of $2 billion in CCC commodities be used for 
this purpose during the three fiscal years ending September 30, 1988. The pur- 
poses the subsidized exports were to serve are broadly  stated: in addition to 
combating other countries’ subsidies and the high value of the dollar, export 
subsidies may be used to offset “the adverse effects of U.S. agricultural price 
support levels that are temporarily above the export prices offered by overseas 
competitors in export markets” (Food Security Act of 1985, US.  Statutes at 
Large 99: 1483). 
In addition, the act authorized the unlimited use of cross-subsidization, that 
is, the use of one CCC commodity to subsidize the export of another. This was 
politically important because many commodity interests, including processed 
products and products which did not have price support programs,  prevailed 
upon the agriculture committees for support. Egg producers and pork produc- 
ers, for example, testified that they needed assistance in competing with EC 
export subsidies. But no CCC stocks of these commodities existed. The legisla- 
tion shared EEP benefits across commodities by permitting CCC wheat stocks 
to be used to subsidize egg or pork exports. 
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because  the  farm support  programs  are ‘‘entitlements’’-the  appropriations 
committees provide open-ended funding for the Commodity Credit Corpora- 
tion to achieve its price support mandates. The committees do not control how 
the CCC uses its acquired  commodity stocks. Congress could have brought 
budgetary disciplines to bear by scoring EEP costs in Budget Committee pro- 
ceedings.  However, Congress agreed with the OMB on zero scoring for the 
EEP. The principal argument was that CCC commodities cost so much to store 
that it was worth as much to give them away as to keep them. In addition, to 
the extent that increased  exports increased the U.S. market price, deficiency 
payments for wheat and other target-price commodities would be reduced. 
The Export Enhancement Program came into being with very little opposi- 
tion. Why was the way so clear? The natural opponents of an export subsidy 
are U.S. domestic wheat buyers and foreign wheat producers. In the case of 
the EEP, U.S. millers were diverted by their participation in subsidized flour 
exports and by the release of CCC stocks to pay the subsidies. The bakers and 
broader consumer groups were relatively weak participants, and their partici- 
pation in the 1985 farm bill debate was focused on opposition to acreage con- 
trols and on limiting budgetary outlays. In summary, the Export Enhancement 
Program was enacted in 1985 because wheat growers and exporters asked for 
it, and no interest group opposed it, except some economists in general terms. 
Because the pressure to assist agriculture was strong, and was countered only 
by budgetary pressures, the OMB finding that the EEP would be budget neutral 
ensured its supporters of  an easy political victory. 
6.2  Consequences and Evaluation of the Program 
Questions were being raised about the effectiveness of the Export Enhance- 
ment Program even before  its legislative enactment. The administration  an- 
nounced its first EEP initiatives in May  1985. By October only two sales had 
been made. In October and November the House Committee on Agriculture’s 
Subcommittee on Department Operations, Research, and Foreign Agriculture 
held hearings to review complaints about EEP administration. 
The procedures for implementing the EEP were far from clear. There were 
(and are) two main steps: administration approval of an EEP initiative, and the 
USDA’s  acceptance of  exporters’  bids for bonuses  under the initiative. The 
approach raises questions of how the USDA can determine, for each proposed 
sale, what the competitor’s price is. Wouldn’t the competitor’s price itself be 
affected by an EEP? And is there sufficient incentive for U.S. commercial ex- 
porters to obtain the highest possible market price? 
Statistics of  EEP shipments are shown in table 6.1. After a slow start, EEP 
exports reached 26.6 million metric tons in fiscal 1988, about half of all U.S. 
wheat  exports.  The average  subsidy  reached  $38 per ton  in  1987. A price 
wedge this large on substantial quantities would be expected to make a notice- 
able difference in world trade flows and prices. 65  Export Program for Wheat 
Table 6.1  Export Enhancement Program (EEP) Wheat Sales and Bonuses 
Total  Total 
EEP Sales  EEP Bonus  Average  U.S. Exports” 
Fiscal  Metric Tons  Dollars  EEP Bonus  Metric Tons  EEP Shareb 





















































Source: Economic Research Service, USDA. 
.‘Fiscal year exports, which differ from crop-year data used elsewhere in this paper. Constructed 
from USDA monthly export statistics. 
bEEP  tonnage as percentage of total export tonnage. 
The USDA uses a wheat simulation model in which each million-ton  in- 
crease in wheat exports generates an increase of ten cents per bushel in the 
U.S.  farm price of wheat.  Each ten-cent  rise in the price of  wheat reduces 
deficiency payments by $174 million. Empirical studies suggest that an EEP 
of 20 million tons adds 2 to 6 million tons to U.S. export demand. With a $50 
per ton bonus level, the budget outlays for the EEP are $1 billion  annually 
(recent levels). The 2 to 6 million  ton  increase in exports causes the wheat 
price to  rise twenty to sixty cents per bushel and hence budget outlays to de- 
cline $350 to $1,050 million annually. Thus, if the high end of “additionality” 
pertains, which is what the USDA assumes, the EEP is budget neutral. 
The main losses from the Export Enhancement Program accrue to domestic 
buyers of U.S. wheat. The exact incidence on the buyers’ side-among  farmers 
who feed wheat, millers, bakers, retailers, and final consumers-has  not been 
estimated. Because domestic final demand for foods containing wheat is quite 
inelastic, domestic consumption of these products is unlikely to change appre- 
ciably because of the EEP, and in fact domestic use has been quite stable over 
time despite large changes in wheat prices. It is therefore unlikely that the EEP 
reduced the demand for, and thus the returns earned by, processors, distribu- 
tors, or other middlemen. Certainly thq evidence in the political debate is con- 
sistent with this conclusion. Millers add bakers who took public positions fa- 
vored the Export Enhancement Program  (usually because they had export as 
well as domestic interests). 
Each increase of ten cents per bushel in the price of wheat raises farm in- 
come by $60 million and reduces consumers’ surplus by $120 million (Salathe 
1991). The consumer cost estimate assumes that farm price increases for all 66  Bruce L. Gardner 
Table 6.2  Economic Gains from the Export Enhancement Program (EEP) 
Additionality  .I  .3 
Millon Dollars 
Annually 
Cost of  EEP subsidies  -  1000  -  1000 
Deficiency payment reduction  350  1050 
Subtotal: budgetary gain  -650  50 
Crop producers’ income gain  I20  300 
Livestock feeders’ gain  -40  -  100 
Consumers’ gain  -200  -500 
Total U.S. gain  -  770  -250 
Source; Salathe (1991) and calculations described in text 
domestically used wheat are passed on to consumers without any change in 
the farm-to-consumer markup or profits in the wheat processing industry. The 
farm income increase is only about one-fourth of the rise in the market value 
of the wheat crop because three-fourths of wheat production are protected by 
deficiency payments which decline cent for cent as the market price rises. 
The overall domestic welfare effect of the EEP can be estimated by  sum- 
ming the budget, consumer, and producer changes if we assume that the farm 
income change is a change in economic rents (Le., farmland and farm operator 
labor taken as fixed in supply). For the range of additionality of 0.1 to 0.3, the 
EEP, at its average recent size of about 20 million tons and cost of $1 billion 
annually, generates the results shown in table 6.2. While an optimistic assump- 
tion of additionality permits the EEP to achieve the objective of budget neutral- 
ity, no assumption permits the program to achieve its cost-effectiveness objec- 
tive of providing a benefit to the U.S. economy. Indeed, by these estimates the 
EEP is a particularly  inefficient income transfer program, generating almost 
$1 in deadweight losses (from the U.S. viewpoint) for each $1 of farm income 
gain even under an optimistic additionality assumption. The main reason for 
the large net U.S. losses is that so much of the subsidy is a transfer to foreign 
buyers of U.S. wheat. 
6.3  Political Response to the EEP in the 1990s 
In 1990 the legislation authorizing the EEP (and other farm programs) ex- 
pired and was reconsidered  in a comprehensive set of  hearings (U.S. House 
1991; U.S. Senate 1991). This provided a convenient opportunity for interest 
groups to express second thoughts and to suggest modifications  of  the EEP. 
The National Association of Wheat Growers, as well as representatives of other 
commodities using the program, were totally supportive of continuation of the 
EEP without substantial change. Concerns that had been expressed in the 1985 
House hearings about targeting as opposed  to a generally available subsidy 67  Export Program for Wheat 
disappeared.  Grain  users might  have been  expected to be more critical, but 
more of them supported the EEP in  1990 than in 1985. The American Bakers 
Association,  the  Biscuit  and  Cracker  Manufacturers’  Association,  and  the 
North American Export Grain Association all testified in favor of continuing 
the program. 
Because  of  firm  support from commodity  and  agribusiness  groups,  and 
weak opposition, the EEP emerged unchanged in structure and strengthened 
in budget in the 1990 Farm Act. EEP spending was far higher in fiscal  1991 
through 1993 than in any previous three-year period (table 6.1). The solid polit- 
ical support was attributable not so much to particular export achievements of 
the EEP, but to farmers’ general satisfaction with the recovery of farm income 
from mid- 1980s lows and the role of the commodity programs in that recovery. 
CCC wheat inventories had been sold off, deficiency payments protected pro- 
ducers from low prices in 1986, the export market had recovered with the dol- 
lar’s decline from its 1985 high, and reduced output boosted wheat prices back 
to 1980-81  levels in 1989 and 1990. Farm interests in the 1990  farm bill debate 
were devoted mainly to attempting to forestall the budget cuts (about $2 billion 
annually) that the Bush administration was calling for. The EEP was thus seen 
as a piece of a set of programs that were working. 
Beyond general satisfaction with  the  situation, EC subsidized exports re- 
mained a principal threat to U.S. grain producers. The EEP was seen as particu- 
larly valuable in this situation, with the Uruguay Round languishing in its fifth 
year of negotiations.  The 1990 act authorized the EEP at a level of not less 
than $500 million annually and explicitly authorized cash as well as in-kind 
subsidies. It said that the only purpose of the EEP was “to discourage unfair 
trade practices”  (U.S. House  1990, 335). The context for this focus was the 
continued expansion of the European Community’s subsidized exports and the 
EC’s intransigence on agriculture in the Uruguay Round, then scheduled for 
completion in December  1990. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, en- 
acted in October 1990 along with the Farm Act, contained a “GATT trigger” 
that required spending $1 billion annually on the EEP if no Uruguay Round 
agreement had been  reached by  June 30,  1992. (Since it turned out that no 
agreement was reached by  that time, EEP spending duly proceeded at about 
the $1 billion rate.) 
Opposition to the EEP in  1990 was mitigated because farm bill reformers 
focused on other policies. The only organized reform effort, by a coalition of 
conservative  Republicans and urban Democrats in the House of  Representa- 
tives, brought to the floor of the House amendments to reduce or eliminate the 
sugar, wool, and honey programs, and eliminate deficiency payments to farms 
with over a million dollars in sales or farmers who earned more than $100,000 
from off-farm  sources. The amendments all failed. They had more apparent 
popular appeal than  an anti-EEP amendment would have; this helps explain 
why none was offered. 
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ing to be scored as budget neutral. The reforms that were successful in  1990, 
most notably the introduction of a 15 percent reduction in deficiency payments 
by making 15 percent of each producer’s base acreage ineligible for payments, 
were driven by  the budget reconciliation  agreement to cut $13 billion  from 
farm program spending over the five fiscal years 1992 through  1996.’ The $I 
billion annual spending on the EEP would have been a prime target for cuts if 
the program had not been scored as budget neutral by the OMB. 
Finally, it is noteworthy that the EC has introduced significant reforms of 
the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), including acreage set-aside and other 
measures to reduce outlays on their export subsidies, and that the permanence 
of these reforms has been strengthened by the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT) on agriculture reached in January  1994. This agreement 
requires that both Europe and the United States reduce export subsidies sub- 
stantially over a five-year period. The United States’s willingness to spend on 
the EEP quite likely had a role in encouraging these reforms, though how im- 
portant a role is unclear.2 
6.4  Conclusions 
Interest-group outcomes of the EEP can be summarized as follows. Wheat 
producers  were  substantial economic  gainers from the program.  Wheat  ex- 
porting businesses were also supportive of the EEP, and were winners. Other 
agricultural producers, notably, feed grains, gained by obtaining a piece of the 
EEP action  and  also  supported the  program. The losing groups-domestic 
grain processors and consumers-did  not visibly oppose the program. 
Perhaps the most  striking feature of  the political economy of  the  Export 
Enhancement Program is how little impact standard economic arguments have 
had. Economists have produced many analyses showing that the program, even 
as a second-best measure, generates a net loss to the U.S. economy. 
The biggest  losers from the Export  Enhancement  Program  are buyers of 
1. This cut was calculated from a five-year baseline of future spending, not from current (1990) 
levels. As it  turned out, farm program spending was not $13 billion below the  1990 baseline. 
Indeed, the cuts notwithstanding, farm program spending between  1992 and 1995 has exceeded 
the baseline level that was projected before the “13 billion cut.” 
2. Although it is even more conjectural than the earlier calculations, CAP reform and GA’IT 
could well reduce EC wheat exports by  3 to 4 million tons annually and raise the US. market 
price by twenty to thirty cents per bushel. The resulting gain for US.  producers would be $120 to 
$1 80 million annually, and the gains to taxpayers would be $350 to $520 million (because of fewer 
deficiency payments). US.  consumers would lose $240 to $360 million. The overall net gain to 
the United States, roughly equal to the price increase times wheat exports, would be  $230 to 
$350 million. 
Suppose the EEP accelerated CAP reform by  five years. Then the EEP generated $1.1 to $1.8 
billion for the United States. The overall U.S.  cost of the EEP between 1990 and 1992 was $5 10 
million annually, or about $2 to $3 billion between  1986 and  1993. These calculations are of 
course crude, but they indicate that it is quite difficult to obtain any net U.S. gain from the EEP as 
a strategic investment, even under the assumption that it successfully induced policy changes in 
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wheat, with losses of $250 to $600 million per year according  to estimates 
presented earlier, with recent world price data suggesting that the lower end of 
the range is more likely. But no buyers of wheat-millers,  bakers, livestock 
producers, or consumers of retail products containing wheat-have  raised po- 
litically significant objections to the program. Agribusiness interests probably 
did not bear any losses. Livestock feeders’ costs have not been substantial, and 
a feeling of  solidarity along with logrolling keeps them  from opposing the 
program. Consumer costs are only about $1 to $3 per year per person, and the 
general public remains generally supportive of farmers according to polls. 
In short, the Export Enhancement Program has proved a political winner be- 
cause 
wheat producers see a benefit from it; 
wheat producers have a unified view on the issue, and they have effec- 
tive channels of influence through the congressional Agriculture com- 
mittees; 
wheat buyers have not opposed the program; 
the program has been accepted as budget neutral. 
There are two points of vulnerability for the Export Enhancement Program 
in the near future. The first is in the budgetary arena. Budget neutrality argu- 
ments have been abandoned now that CCC stocks are no longer used as bo- 
nuses and apparent effects on U.S. prices are small. EEP spending has already 
been cut about $200 million for fiscal year  1995. The second point is that the 
GATT in agriculture will require a further reduction of the EEP over time. This 
makes EEP reform part of  a policy package that will make U.S. farmers as 
well as nonfarmers better off than at present. 
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